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OIL TANKER REGULATION:
A STATE OR FEDERAL AREA?

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WASHINGTON TANKER LAW: Washington may enforce part of its Tanker Law. The federal Ports and

Waterways Safety Act pre-empts the state Tanker Law in some areas,
but not in others. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151

(1978).
INTRODUCTION
Puget Sound in the state of Washington is a manificent product of
nature's handiwork. It was wrought by the movements of the earth's
crusal plates and then refined by the actions of glaciers some 14,000
years ago.' It contains approximately 700 square miles of water
surrounded by 1,400 miles of rugged coastline. It is a scenic and
wooded country which still boasts relatively pure water. Many of the
activities of the area are dependent upon this purity of water. There
are oyster beds and salmon fishing in the area, as well as a substantial
amount of recreational sailing. However, the delicate balance of
nature in Puget Sound (Sound), in addition to its natural beauty, is
threatened by the large amounts of crude oil being delivered to refineries within the Sound.
As of January 1977, there were 335,000 barrels of crude oil
coming into the Sound by tanker each day.' Much of this is from the
rich oil fields of Alaska. There is a constant threat of a collision of an
oil tanker with another vessel in one of the narrow channels of the
Sound. 3 Oceanographers estimate that if a major spill were to occur
within the Sound, crude oil would cover the entire Sound area within
two 24 hour tidal periods. According to one expert, the question is
not if a major oil spill will occur, but rather when one will occur.4
The possibility of an oil spill resulting from a collision of a tanker
is easily understood when oil tanker's stopping ability and maneuverability are examined. According to a Senate Report,' it takes a
1. 151 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 7 (1977).

2. Id. at 79.
3. Some channels are less than one mile wide.
4. Bob Lynette, an aeronautical engineer, who applied all the available data on oil spills
throughout the world to conditions of the Sound.
5. S. Rept. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), at 18.
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tanker two and one-half miles and twenty-one

minutes to come to a complete emergency stop. Such a stop involves
slaloming the ship, or fish-tailing it back and forth, and reversing the
engines. In a relatively narrow channel, it would take much longer, in
terms of both time and distance, to bring a ship to a complete stop
because it would be impossible to slalom. The maneuverability of a
250,000 DWT tanker vessel with 30,000 horsepower units has been
compared to a forty foot boat with a one-half horsepower motor.7
Thus, it is apparent that a large tanker would have difficulty stopping
or avoiding an unexpected obstacle, such as another ship. This is
especially true in a confined irregularly shaped area of water such as
the Sound where the amount of warning time before seeing an
obstacle might be small. A collision could rupture the oil compartments of a tanker and result in a devastating oil spill.
Given the danger of oil spills damaging the untarnished beauty of
Puget Sound, the Washington legislature enacted the Washington
Tanker Law (Tanker Law) in 1975' to govern the design,9 size, 0
and movements' 1 of oil tankers within Puget Sound. These same
areas of regulation are also covered nationally by the Federal Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).' 2 When the Tanker Law
came into effect, the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), which
operates one of the six oil refineries in the Sound, brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
to enjoin enforcement of the statute.' 3 The primary allegations by
6. DWT or deadweight tons is the actual weight in metric tons of cargo to bring a vessel
down to her load waterline.
7. Supra, note 5, at 18.
8. WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.180 (1977).
9. Id. at §88.16.190(2): An oil tanker, whether enrolled or registered, of 40,000 to
125,000 DWT may proceed beyond points enumerated in (1) if tanker possess all of the
following standard safety features:
a) Shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two and one half
deadweight tons; and
b) Twin Screws; and
c) Double Bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid cargo compartments; and
d) Two radars in working order and operating, one of which must be collision
avoidance radar; and
e) Such other navigational position location systems as may be prescribed
from time to time ...
10. Id. at § 88.16.190(1): Any oil tanker, whether enrolled or registered, of greater than
125,000 DWT shall be prohibited from proceeding beyond a point east of a line extending
from Discovery Island light South to New Dungeness light.
11. Id. at § 88.16.180: Any oil tanker, whether enrolled or registered, of 50,000 DWT or
greater shall be required to take a Washington state licensed pilot while navigating Puget
Sound and adjacent waters and shall be liable for and pay pilotage rates.
12. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § §1221 et seq. and 46
U.S.C. § 39 1(a) (1976).
(W.D. Wash. 1976).
Supp. _
13. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, _F.
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ARCO were that the Tanker Law was pre-empted by federal law,' "
that it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce and was
therefore in violation of the Commerce Clause,' ' and that it interfered with the regulation of foreign affairs by the federal government.
A three judge district court' 6 held that the Tanker Law was preempted in its entirety and enjoined Washington from enforcing it.
This decision has been amply discussed in two recent law review
articles.' ' Washington appealed and the United States Supreme
Court granted cert.' 8
SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court dealt with the Tanker Law in a thorough,
systematic fashion. To begin with, it discussed several principles it
had established in previous cases for examining pre-emption questions.
When a federal law is enacted, which is alleged to pre-empt a state
law, the state law in question is assumed to be valid unless preemption is intended by the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' ' If there is any pre-emptive capability present, whether a
state regulation is pre-empted or not depends primarily on the congressional intent as it is ascertained by the Court.2 0
Congressional purpose is not always easily determined, but it can
be evidenced in several ways. A federal pattern of regulation may be
so expansive as to give rise to an inference that Congress intended
there to be no room left for states to act.2 ' The federal interest may
so dominate a field that enforcement of state law on the subject is
precluded. 2 2 Or the end desired by the federal action and the kind
of obligations imposed on the federal government may indicate a
desire to pre-empt any similar state actions.2 3
There are other situations in which a state statute may fail even
though Congress has not completely occupied the field. Where there
is a valid exercise of congressional power and a state law or part of it
14. Primarily the PWSA. Supra, note 12.

15. U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl.
3.
16. This is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976): A district court of three judges shall be
convened when ... an action is filed of any statewide legislative body.
17. Note, 10 VAND. J.TRANS. L. 315 (1977) and Note, 17 NAT. RES. J. 691 (1977).
18. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978).
19. Court quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
20. Engdahl, Pre-emptive Capability of FederalPower, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1973).
21. Court citing Rice, supra note 18.
22. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
23. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
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actually conflicts with the federal law, the state law is void. Such a
situation arises, for example, when compliance with both laws is a
physical impossibility. 2 Another situation in which a state law will
fail is where it frustrates the attainment of the "full purposes and
objectives of Congress."" After laying down these principles, the
Court proceeded to analyze the Tanker Law's three basic sections.
Part of the pilotage requirement provision of the Tanker Law,
section 88.16.180, was in direct conflict with a federal law, namely,
sections 215 and 364 of title 46. The Washington law required both
enrolled and registered' 6 oil tankers of over 50,000 DWT to take on
a Washington licensed pilot when traveling the Sound. The two federal provisions had previously been held by the Court to give exclusive authority to the federal government to regulate pilots on
enrolled vessels.2 ' The Court sustained the district court's finding of
invalidity as to the Tanker Law's requirement for enrolled tankers to
have a Washington licensed pilot on board while within the Sound.
The Court, however, held that Washington is still free to require its
own licensed pilots on those tankers engaged in foreign trade (registered). The federal law did not give the federal government the
exclusive authority to regulate pilots on registered vessels. In fact,
section 101(5) of the PWSA 2 8 and 46 U.S.C. § 215 provide for and
recognize a state's right to require one of its licensed pilots on board
a registered vessel within its jurisdiction.2
The next provision of the Tanker Law the Court examined was
§ 88.16.190(2), which deals with design and safety requirements for
oil tankers. The federal government also legislated in this area by
enacting Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. This law
requires the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 3 to establish
rules and regulations covering the "comprehensive minimum
standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance and
operation" of oil tankers as are necessary to protect life, property
24. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 22, at 67.
26. Enrolled vessels are those engaged only in domestic trade. Registered vessels are those
involved in foreign trade.
27. Together these statutes make it clear that coastwise seagoing vessels (except under
register) are to be under the control of the Coast Guard licensed pilots (§ 364) and that no
state can impose its own licensing requirements in addition to the Coast Guards (§ 215). The
case which the Court relied upon is Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912).
28. 33 U.S.C. §1221(5) (1976).
29. Section 101(5) provides that the Secretary of Transportation is to require pilots on
board when "a pilot is not otherwise required by state law to be on board ..."
30. The Coast Guard is located in the Transportation Department and 49 C.F.R.
§ 1.46(n)(4) (1976) delegates authority to the commander of the Coast Guard to carry out
the functions vested in the Secretary by the PWSA.
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and the marine environment from harm.' ' The Secretary met this
mandate by issuing regulations which govern design and equipment
specifications of tank vessels. 3 2 To ensure compliance with the
regulations, the Coast Guard inspects vessels and issues certificates to
those which pass. 3"

The Court felt that the extent of the authority granted to the
Secretary indicated "that Congress intended uniform national standards for the design and construction of tankers that would foreclose
the imposition of different or more stringent state standards." 3"
Prior cases3 ' which held that "vessels must conform to 'reasonable,
nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection
measures

. .

.' imposed by a state" were distinguished. 3 6 In these

cases, the federal law had a different scope, purpose, and/or intent
than the state law. In the instant case, the federal and state statutes
and regulations seek exactly the same ends: protection of the environment from possible oil spills. Since the state law attempts to
exclude vessels which have been certified as safe by the Secretary,
the Supremacy Clause requires the state statute to give way to the
federal determination. Hence, this part of the Tanker Law was held
invalid.
In discussing this issue, the Court also noted a legislative concern
for arriving at uniform international design standards for tankers.3 '
The congressional objective of achieving world-wide design specifications makes an even stronger case for overturning the Washington
law. The Tanker Law, if enforced as originally passed, would hinder
both 3 a national and an international desire for uniformity in this
area. 8
The Washington law provided a means to avoid the design requirements of § 88.16.190(2). If a vessel employs a certain amount of tug
escorts, then the design provisions do not apply. 3 This part of the
Washington law was upheld by the Court.
31. 46 U.S.C. §391(a)(1), (3) (1976). A Senate amendment to the PWSA as proposed by
the House which amended the Tank Vessel Act.
32. 46 C.F.R. 30-40 (1976).
33. 46 U.S.C. §391(a)(6) (1976).
34. Supra note 17, at 163, 997.
35. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
36. Douglas v. Seacoast Product, Inc., Id at 277.
37. Supra note 5. The Report expressed a desire for international solutions to the worldwide problem of marine pollution.
38. In fact, foreign nations expressed concern over the imposition of even national
standards.
39. Supra note 8, at §88.16.190(2)(e): ...if the tanker is in ballast or is under the
escort of a tug or tugs with an aggregate shaft horsepower equivalent to five percent of the
deadweight tons of that tanker ... the design requirements are not applicable.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

The Court viewed the tug escort provision as an operating rule
which originates from the local conditions of the Sound. Such a
measure is within the reach of the Secretary under Title I of the
federal PWSA.4 0 However, Title I which deals with tanker operating procedures, as opposed to Title II of the PWSA, does not
require the issuance of regulations to carry out these procedures, but
only authorizes the Secretary to do so. Since the Secretary is not
required to issue regulations under Title I, his failure to do so should
not be interpreted to mean that no regulation is desirable in the area.
If he does not issue regulations or take some other action so as to
indicate that the area is occupied by the federal government, the area
should be open for state regulation. The Court stated that the Secretary had not taken any action in this area and, until he does, the
Tanker Law tug escort provision is valid. 4 1
Any oil tanker in excess of 125,000 DWT is prohibited from operating in Puget Sound by the Tanker Law. 4 I The Court held this
providion void after examining Title I of the federal PWSA. 4 I In
order to invalidate this section of the Tanker Law, the Court needed
to find that the Secretary had acted in the area of size limitations for
Puget Sound. The federal law, section 1221(3)(iii) of the PWSA,
gives the Secretary the power to establish vessel size and speed limitations. The Secretary, through the local Coast Guard, enacted a navigation rule 4 4 affecting part of the Sound: the Rosario Strait. This
rule imposes a size limitation on vessels passing through the Rosario
Strait at any one time. The Court construed this navigation rule as an
action by the Secretary in the area of size restrictions. Thus, the
Washington law concerning limiting the size of oil tankers in the
Sound was contrary to the federal law and had to give way.
The Court also thought the size limitation imposed by the Tanker
Law could be viewed as a design requirement covered by Title II of
the PWSA. Design requirements had been previously found by the
Court to be completely covered by the federal law. 4 I If the size
limitation had been viewed in this fashion, it would have been held
invalid.
Even if the Secretary had not acted in the area of size limitations
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iii), (iv) (1976). The Secretary can establish vessel size and speed
limitations and vessel operating conditions.
41. The Secretary is considering issuing regulations in this area.
42. §88.16.190(1).
43. Supra note 18, at 1002.
44. The rule prohibits the passage of more than one 70,000 DWT vessel through Rosario
Strait in any direction at any given time and the size restriction is reduced to 40,000 DWT
in periods of bad weather.
45. Supra note 18, at 1000.
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and the size requirement of the Tanker Law was thought to come
under Title I of the PWSA, the Court stated it "would be reluctant to
sustain the Tanker Law's absolute ban on tankers larger than 125,000
DWT." 4'6 The Court's interpreted the Secretary's failure to act in
this area as being akin to "a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute." 4 This
interpretation views the federal statute as containing an implied savings clause. In other words, either the federal government should act
in the area in question or there should be no regulation in the area.4 8
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist wanted to uphold the
Tanker Law's size limitation. They did not feel that the Secretary,
through the Coast Guard, considered the question of size restrictions
on tankers within the Sound when they enacted the passage regulation concerning Rosario Strait. They viewed the Secretary's "navigation rule" as just that-a rule dealing with the particular hazards of
Rosario Strait. The rule was not deemed to be a judgment as to size
limitations for the entire Sound. Even if the rule was construed as
dealing with size considerations for the entire Sound, the Washington
Tanker Law ban on 125,000 DWT tankers was not shown to be
inconsistent with the federal determination.
The minorities' view on the size restriction provision appears to be
the preferrable one. The majority's rationale seems to view the
Rosario Strait passage rule too broadly. This rationale considers the
Secretary's "navigation rule" as a judgment by the federal government that no size restrictions on tankers are appropriate for the
entire Puget Sound. The Court should not construe federal laws or
regulations more broadly than they are intended and, in effect, invalidate legitimate exercises of state power.
Justices Stevens and Powell agreed with the majority opinion except in regards to the tug escort requirement provision.4 They felt
that this provision was so entwined with the design requirement of
the Tanker Law that it should be voided along with the latter provision. They viewed this provision as a special penalty on shippers
and oil producers for non-compliance with the design and safety
requirements of the Washington law. The invalidation of one, they
reasoned, should result in the invalidation of the other.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act was passed by the Congress
with the express purpose of protecting the "environmental quality of
46. Supra note 17, at 178, 1004.
47. Court quoting from Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947).
48. For a good discussion of this concept, see Note, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
49. §88.16.190(2)(e).
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ports, waterfront areas, and the navigable waters of the U.S." ' I This
law delegated broad powers to the Coast Guard. Title II of the federal statute declares:
[T] he carriage by vessels of certain cargoes in bulk creates substantial hazards to life, property, the navigable waters of the United
States and the resources contained therein ...

[i] t is necessary that

there be established for all such vessels documented under the laws of
the United States or entering the navigable water of the United
States comprehensive minimum standards of design,...
Similarly Title I of the PWSA states:
In order to ... protect the navigable waters and the resources

therein from environmental harm resulting from vessel or structure
damage, destruction, or loss, the Secretary ... may (1) establish,
operate, and maintain vessel traffic services ... (2) require vessels

which operate in an area of a vessel traffic service or system to
utilize or comply with that service or system, including the carrying
or installation of electronic or other devices ... (3) (iii) establish
vessel size and speed limitations and vessel operating conditions... 52
The Washington Tanker Law contains a similar intent and purpose as
Title I and II of the federal law.
Because of the danger of spills, the legislature finds that the transportation of crude oil and refined petroleum products by tankers on
Puget Sound and adjacent water creates a great potential hazard to
important natural resources of the state .... It is therefore the intent
and purpose .... of this 1975 act to decrease the likelihood of oil
spills. .... 13

The Court's conclusions, save for the invalidation of the Tanker
Law's size restriction, appear proper when viewed from strictly constitutional law principles. The federal and state laws express the same
purpose: to protect the navigable waters and the resources within
them. They both seek accomplishment of these goals by similar
means. But the federal law was intended to and does cover a broad
area of tanker regulation. It occupies the field as far as transportation
of oil by tankers is concerned. Thus the state law, to the extent that
it interferes with the federal law, is pre-empted.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Supra note 5, at 7.
46 U.S.C. §391(a)(1) (1976).
46 U.S.C. §1221 (1976).
WASH. REV. CODE §88.16.170 (1977).
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CONCLUSION
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act is aimed at protecting the
water environment for all the states, territories and possessions of the
United States, and Puerto Rico." 4 Diverse conditions exist in these
various areas. The regulations concerning some of these conditions
would be better left to local solutions, which more adequately
accommodate the local diversity. The design requirements of vessels
operating in the open, relatively calm waters of the Gulf of Mexico
should be much different than those applied to vessels traveling
through the potentially rough, ice-laden waters around Alaska or
Puget Sound. If design requirements are to be uniform, then they
should be sufficiently protective of the environment in all possible
areas where tankers may operate. Some considerations, such as size
of vessels, should not be nationally governed at all. The individual
characteristics of the different ports around the world need to be
considered. For instance, thre is some dispute as to whether a large
tanker of over 125,000 DWT could even make it through the Rosario
5
Strait without hitting the bottom. s
In view of the considerable damage which a major oil spill would
cause, even a slight amount of risk is unacceptable if that risk can be
reduced." 6 If a major oil spill were to occur in an area such as Puget
Sound, it would be many years before the area would be restored to
its original condition.
The costs of better control are insignificant when compared to the
potential harm. The entire process of finding oil, drilling, pumping,
refining it and delivering it to the consumer is a long and involved
process. The cost of sea transportation of oil is a very small percentage of the total cost of the final product to the consumer. Even if all
of the design modifications advocated by the Tanker Law were installed on tankers, it is estimated that the increase in the cost of
gasoline to the consumer would be several cents per gallon at the
most.' I This is a small price to pay for the added protection to the
environment such modifications would provide.
The solution to the ocean oil spill problem necessarily needs to be
54. 46 U.S.C. §1221 (1976).
55. The minimum water depth in the Rosario Strait is 60 feet and there is disagreement
as to how much depth some large vessels need.
56. Many factors affect the biological impact of oil spills, such as dosage, oil type,
oceanographic conditions, season, etc. See PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (1973).
57. The cost of double-bottoms alone would add anywhere from four to ten percent to
the cost of a new tanker. See Pedrick, Tankship Design Regulation and Its Economic Effect
on Oil Consumers, 9 J. MAR. L. COMM. 377 (1978).
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an international one. It serves little purpose to require American
ships to be as safe as possible when ships from other countries are
relatively unsafe. The majority of the tankers in the world are not
American owned and licensed. The impact of strict regulation of
American ships alone is not significant. The United Nations realizes
this and in 1959 formed the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) to deal with environmental matters on
the oceans.' '
IMCO's record, though, has been rather dismal to date, especially
in the area of design and construction standards.' 9 This organization
has not been forthcoming with the needed stricter design standards
for tankers. Congress considered IMCO's failure to act when it enacted the PWSA. There was much foreign opposition to unilaterally
imposed design standards by the United States. The response to these
objections was that the impact of the legislation would not be great
since 85 percent of the world's oil tankers are foreign and the
standards would only put American ships at an economic disadvantage if foreign ships were not governed by the proposed legislation also. 6 Congress did not feel it could wait until some international standards might be forthcoming, as effective action was
thought to be necessary in 1972 when the PWSA was passed. Foreign
interests were taken into account, however. The effective date of the
regulations was deferred for foreign vessels to allow time for possible
international solutions to the problems.
Necessary precautions are needed now. The longer acceptable solutions take to be actualized, the greater the chances are that a major
spill will occur. As a writer in the 1920's said of Puget Sound: "Here
is the beauty and stark grandeur of a North that has no harshness." 6 That beauty should not be destroyed by an oil spill.
ROBERT MUEHLENWEG

58. OIL ON THE PUGET SOUND, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY IN SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING, U. WASH. PRESS (1972).
59. Supra note 5, at 23.
60. Id. at 22.
61. R. WALKINSHAW, ON PUGET SOUND 18 (1929).

